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In SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Judge Rakoff rejected a
$285 million settlement between the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) and Citigroup.
The
complaint alleged that Citigroup failed to disclose its role in the
selection of assets for a billion dollar collaterized debt obligation.
Judge Rakoff rejected the consent judgment, concluding it was
neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate, nor in the public’s
interest. The critical issue in Judge Rakoff’s decision was the
validity of the SEC’s “no admit/deny” policy, which is a policy that
has long been accepted by courts. He objected to this policy because
it required the court to employ its power without the parties
providing him a factual basis, which constrained his ability to
exercise his independent judgment. This decision has great
implications for the SEC’s enforcement program. The SEC relied on
courts’ longtime acceptance of a standard that produced an efficient
and effective process with regards to consent judgments. This
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Comment analyzes the differences between the traditional standard
and the Rakoff standard by illustrating the differences that each
standard has on the outcome of consent judgments. Finally, this
Comment recommends that a combination of both standards be used
for future consent judgments to ensure greater enforcement,
accountability, and transparency.
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INTRODUCTION

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or
“Commission”) is authorized to bring a civil injunction action as a
form of enforcement against violators of securities laws.1 When the
SEC brings a civil action in federal district court, it often requests an
injunction against future violations of federal securities laws. 2 A
consent judgment, or consent decree, is a civil settlement
incorporated within a judicial order3 and is used in more than ninety
percent of the SEC’s civil actions.4 Once a settlement is reached, the
defendant consents to the entry of a judgment or order without
admitting or denying the allegations. 5 A judge then evaluates the
proposed consent judgment with a limited source of information and,
therefore, the entry of the consent judgment is often ministerial. 6
Even though judicial inquiry is limited, the court is still required to
exercise its independent judgment.7
The Supreme Court has long endorsed the use of consent
judgments,8 and courts recognize consent judgments as an effective
and efficient means of dispute resolution. 9 The standard used to
1. See Carmen Lawrence et al., Seeing Beyond the Deal: The Collateral
Consequences of SEC Settlements, 1832 PRAC. LAW INST. 915, 917–18 (2010)
(indicating that civil injunction actions are one of two basic enforcement actions that
the SEC is authorized to bring against defendants).
2. See id. at 917 (explaining the differences between a civil injunctive action and
an administrative proceeding, the two possible enforcement actions the SEC can seek
when enforcing federal securities laws).
3. See Linda Chatman Thomsen, The Expanding Role of Judges in Settlement and
Beyond, 1918 PRAC. LAW INST. 487, 490 (2011) (indicating that in consent judgments,
the court has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement).
4. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (articulating that one of
the reasons the SEC enters many consent judgments is because of the agency’s limited
resources).
5. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2012) (amending the Code of Federal
Regulations due to the SEC’s view that a refusal to admit an allegation is equivalent to
a denial); Danne L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest,
12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 650 (2007) (discussing the SEC’s position that a
refusal to admit an allegation is equal to a denial unless the defendant agrees to neither
admit nor deny the allegations).
6. See Thomsen, supra note 3, at 490 (explaining that the only available sources
of information are the complaint and the proposed order).
7. See id. at 491 (alluding to greater scrutiny because the consent judgment
involves the judge’s signature); see also SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F.
Supp. 2d 328, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (indicating that even though deference is given to a
government agency, invoking a court’s independent judgment is an “indispensible
attribute of the federal judiciary”).
8. See SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Swift & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 311, 325–26 (1928)).
9. See id. (presenting the benefits of consent judgments, including avoiding the
risk and cost of litigation).
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evaluate a consent judgment is whether the court finds the decree
fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public interest. 10 A recent
decision from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York, however, used a different standard to evaluate consent
judgments. The decision, if upheld, will likely have implications on
the SEC’s enforcement program.11
This critical decision was made on November 28, 2011, when
Judge Jed Rakoff rejected a proposed $285 million settlement
between the SEC and Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. (“Citigroup”).12
Contrary to the normal practice of a limited judicial role, Judge
Rakoff expanded the role in reviewing consent judgments.13 He also
placed a greater burden on the SEC to present more facts to justify
the terms of the decree.14 Consequently, in SEC v. Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., Judge Rakoff opened the door to a new set of
questions regarding consent judgments with federal agencies,
causing fear that this decision will result in a stricter standard for
consent judgment settlements.15

10. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(stating that the court will review the proposed consent judgment to determine that it is
within the bounds of “fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy and, in certain
circumstances, whether it services the public interest”).
11. See Yin Wilczek, Court Throws Out Proposed $285M Deal Between SEC,
Citigroup; Sets Case for Trial, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2395 (2011) (quoting the
SEC Enforcement Director’s response to Judge Rakoff’s decision, in which the director
indicated that the decision could hurt the SEC’s enforcement program). See generally
Bradley Bondi & Douglas Fischer, Citigroup Ruling Has Serious Implications for SEC
Settlements, JURIST-SIDEBAR (Jan. 16, 2012), http://jurist.org/sidebar/2012/01/bondifischer-sec-citigroup.php (explaining the SEC’s reluctance to now bring enforcement
actions into court and the possibility of seeking other alternatives to consent decrees).
12. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(holding that the proposed consent judgment was “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor
adequate, nor in the public interest”).
13. See Matthew Farrell, A Role for the Judiciary in Reforming Executive
Compensation: The Implications of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Bank of
America Corp., 96 CORNELL L. REV. 169, 191 (2010) (explaining that Judge Rakoff’s
approach is different than the approach of other judges in similar cases). Compare
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (stating that while the SEC is
entitled to deference, the court must exercise its independent judgment in determining
whether the consent decree serves the public interest), with Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529
(concluding that the lower court applied too strict a standard when evaluating the
approval of a consent decree and should have deferred to the agency’s decision).
14. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (holding that a consent
judgment that imposes penalties on the basis of unproven facts is neither fair nor
reasonable).
15. Cf. SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (granting a consent judgment while noting that the court reserves for the future
“substantial questions of whether the Court can approve other settlements that involve
the practice of ‘neither admitting nor denying’” any wrongdoing).
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This Comment argues that ambiguity exists in the law regarding
the standard used to evaluate consent judgments. The ambiguity is a
result of some courts applying a lenient standard while others apply a
more stringent standard, specifically that of Judge Rakoff’s. This
Comment analyzes the standard previously used to grant consent
judgments (“traditional standard”) and compares it to the stricter
standard applied in Judge Rakoff’s court (“Rakoff standard”).
Applying the Rakoff standard changes the meaning of what courts
previously considered “fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the public’s
interest.” To demonstrate that the application of each standard
results in different outcomes, this Comment will apply each standard
to a set of hypothetical facts involving a multibillion-dollar
corporation, MG Global Corporation, that engaged in securities fraud
and subsequently entered into a consent judgment with the SEC.
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of consent judgments
and the adoption of such decrees in settlements with the SEC. Part I
also discusses the interpretation of both the traditional standard and
the Rakoff standard with an emphasis on three differences: (1)
deference to federal agencies; (2) the “no admit/deny” provision in
consent judgments; and (3) public knowledge of the underlying facts.
Part II analyzes the two standards to show how each standard renders
different outcomes when applied to the same set of hypothetical
facts.
Part III recommends that courts adopt a combination of the
traditional standard and the Rakoff standard in granting consent
judgments to allow for greater transparency and ensure that consent
decrees are meeting the standard of fair, reasonable, adequate, and in
the public interest. Part IV concludes that there is ambiguity in the
law regarding consent judgments and that a clear standard for
granting consent judgments that is neither too stringent nor too
lenient is needed.
I.

CONSENT JUDGMENTS: BEFORE AND AFTER JUDGE RAKOFF

A. The Adoption of Consent Judgments and the Purpose of Consent
Judgments in the SEC’s Enforcement Program

The SEC’s aim is to protect investors and maintain a fair and
efficient market.16 The SEC does this by investigating violations of

16. See The Investor Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
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securities laws and deciding whether to settle with or litigate against
the alleged violators.17 The SEC favors settlements because of their
effective and efficient enforcement and the low risks involved.18 One
type of settlement adopted by the SEC is the consent decree, a
“judgment entered by consent of the parties whereby the defendant
agrees to stop [the] alleged illegal activity without admitting guilt or
wrongdoing.”19 The SEC adopted this standard long ago; however, it
became concerned with defendants publicly denying wrongdoings
following the entry of such judgments. 20 As a result, settlements
with the SEC are entered by consent whereby the defendants agree to
the entry of a judgment while neither admitting nor denying the
allegations.21 The validity of the “no admit/deny” provision had not
been challenged until the Citigroup case.22
Consent judgments positively impact the SEC’s enforcement of
securities laws.23 This is largely due to the fact that the SEC seeks,
in its consent judgments, injunctive relief forbidding future
violations.24 Not only do SEC settlements affect market participants
through these injunctions, they also serve as a means to create and
accept new legal standards.25 Consent judgments offer a sense of
security by enforcing the terms of an agreement as well as reducing
risks and costs of litigation. 26 Further, the SEC is able to save
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (stating the
SEC’s mission and how its enforcement authority is crucial to its effectiveness).
17. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 627–28.
18. See SEC Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court
Regarding Proposed Settlement at 3, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp.
2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387(JSR)), 2011 WL 5307417 [hereinafter SEC
Mem. of Law] (noting that lower courts recognize the “importance of consent
judgments to the SEC’s effective and efficient enforcement of federal securities laws”);
id. at 4 (stating that the Second Circuit has observed a “strong federal policy favoring
the approval and enforcement of consent decrees”).
19. See id. at 11.
20. See id. (explaining that defendants were not admitting to allegations but rather
denying those allegations immediately after the consent judgment was entered).
21. See id. (explaining that the SEC amended its policy to prevent defendants from
denying allegations in both the consent decree and elsewhere).
22. See Bondi & Fischer, supra note 11 (explaining that Judge Rakoff broke the
tradition of granting “neither admit nor deny” settlements).
23. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (contending that there
is a balance of advantages and disadvantages, which the court is reluctant to upset,
when the SEC chooses injunction over litigation).
24. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 331 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (stating that the injunctive relief sought in most consent judgment cases is an
injunction forbidding future violations and a request to enforce future preventative
measures).
25. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 653 (maintaining that a single enforcement action
can cause developments of internal controls, compliance functions, and supervisory
procedures in other companies).

2012

IS JUDGE RAKOFF ASKING FOR TOO MUCH?

189

resources for additional enforcement actions.27 Consequently, courts
often hesitate to deny consent judgments in fear that the balance of
anticipated advantages and disadvantages will be destroyed.28
B. The Traditional Standard Used by Most Courts Involves a More
Lenient Evaluation of Consent Judgments

Historically, courts have given great deference to what the SEC
believes is in the public interest. 29 A consent decree should be
granted unless a court finds the decree to be unfair, inadequate, or
unreasonable. 30 Therefore, the decision of what is in the public
interest should be left with the government agency negotiating the
consent decree. 31 In evaluating a proposed consent judgment, the
Second Circuit asserts that the parties to the settlement should be the
ones to decide the terms of the consent judgment.32
The traditional standard is not whether the court would have
agreed to the proposed consent judgment, but whether the proposed
consent judgment is fair and reasonable.33 The court is not to try and
26. See SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529–30 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that a
consent judgment offers more security than a settlement agreement because it can be
enforced by judicial sanctions, whereas breaching a settlement agreement simply
results in another lawsuit); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 671–72 (explaining that
the Commission is motivated to settle because uncertain results associated with
litigation are avoidable through settlements).
27. See Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529–30 (explaining that the SEC was able to
allocate resources saved through consent judgments towards investigations of other
securities laws violations).
28. See Clifton, 700 F.2d at 748 (discussing the benefits of settlements for the SEC,
such as the ability to conserve its own judicial resources while still informing potential
investors that a company or person has violated securities laws in the past).
29. Farrell, supra note 13, at 188; see Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529 (stating that
courts should give deference to the public agency negotiating the proposed judgment);
FTC. v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) (recognizing that
while courts should not blindly follow an agency’s lead in entering a judgment, they
should give substantial deference to the public agency entering into the negotiated
consent decree).
30. See Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529 (applying the traditional standard because the
lower court applied too strict a standard when it rejected the proposed consent
judgment).
31. See SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 4 n.1 (explaining how the Ninth
Circuit adopted the position that a court should defer to the agency’s decision on
whether a settlement is within the public interest).
32. See In re Sony Corp. SXRD, 448 F. App’x 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting City
of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974)) (stating that the court
should not evaluate a proposed consent judgment based on one that the court itself
might have fashioned).
33. See United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir. 1990)
(stating that an agency’s role deserves heightened respect in situations where
sophisticated players with sharply conflicting interests negotiate an agreement at arm’s
length); Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529 (“Unless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or
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resolve the facts of the case when evaluating a proposed consent
judgment.34 To do so would “emasculate the very purpose for which
settlements are made.”35 After all, a government agency has put the
time and resources into investigating the violations and negotiating
the terms of the decree;36 it is not the court’s role to decide if the best
possible settlement was reached. 37 Accordingly, when reviewing
consent judgments, the courts should pay the parties deference.38
In granting a consent judgment, there is no resolution of the issues
presented; instead, the parties enter into a consent decree with the
understanding that the defendant immediately cease the alleged
illegal activity without admitting or denying guilt.39 With the “no
admit/deny” provision, the Commission is able to resolve the matter
and compensate the victims of the illegal act in a timely and
reasonable manner.40 In these consent judgments, the SEC enters the
provision to preclude a defendant’s subsequent denial of wrongdoing
in order to avoid an assumption that the alleged conduct did not
occur.41 Courts understand that findings of fact are something the
Commission must give up in order to enter a consent judgment,42 and
the SEC believes that without a defendant denying any wrongdoing,
the Commission has essentially proven that the violations did in fact
occur. 43 This policy, according to the SEC, is necessary to
unreasonable, it ought to be approved.”).
34. See United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 582 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The
reviewing court should not determine contested issues of fact that underlie the
dispute.”).
35. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974)
(explaining that the court is not to turn the evaluation of a settlement into a “rehearsal
of the trial”).
36. See Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.
37. See United States v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1436 (6th Cir.
1991) (finding a settlement fair based on the “legal posture of the parties” and “the
nature of the negotiation process that led to the decree”).
38. SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y 2003); see also
Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529 (concluding that the court’s role is to ensure the consent
judgment is reasonable).
39. See SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 11 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
410 (9th ed. 1990)) (defining consent judgments as judgments entered without
admitting guilt).
40. See id. at 12–13 (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of including a
“no admit/deny” provision in a consent judgment).
41. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (stating that the refusal to admit wrongdoing is the
same as a denial).
42. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that the SEC
gives up a number of advantages in order to enter a consent decree, such as findings of
fact and court opinions that set forth reasons for a particular holding).
43. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
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successfully resolve cases involving securities violations. 44
Otherwise, without the strategic wording in the “no admit/deny”
provision, companies would refuse to settle and the SEC would be
unable to carry the costs of litigation.45 Several courts recognize the
benefits of the SEC’s “no admit/deny” policy and choose to grant
consent decrees unless the consent judgments do not meet the
standard of “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”46
C. The Rakoff Standard Involves a More Stringent Evaluation of
Consent Judgments

In SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., Judge Rakoff rejected a
$285 million settlement between the SEC and Citigroup.47 The SEC
alleged that Citigroup’s marketing materials were misleading
because Citigroup failed to disclose its role in the selection of assets
for a $1 billion collaterized debt obligation (“CDO”) portfolio. 48
Citigroup’s marketing materials for the CDO represented that an
independent collateral manager would be selecting the portfolio of
assets. 49 Citigroup, however, failed to disclose that it had a
significant role and influence over the selection of the assets and
even held a short position on those assets.50 In the end, Citigroup

44. See Dunstan Prial, SEC ‘Neither Admits Nor Deny Guilt’ Policy Tests Investor
Trust, FOX BUSINESS (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.foxbusiness.com/industries/2012/
01/20/sec-neither-admit-nor-deny-guilt-policy-tests-investor-trust/ (describing the
policy as a necessary tool for settlements with “deep-pocketed companies”).
45. See id. (reporting that the SEC’s limited resources places it at a disadvantage in
the battle against the companies).
46. See Clifton, 700 F.2d at 748 (holding that the court is reluctant to “upset this
balance” of advantages and disadvantages brought by consent decrees). Cf. SEC v.
Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (granting a consent judgment with “no
admit/deny” provision); SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304,
310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting a consent judgment with “no admit/deny” policy even
though the court had reservations about the policy); United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that criticism of a consent decree that
does not include an admission is “unjustified”).
47. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
48. Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387(JSR)), 2011 WL 4965843; see CDO Definition,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cdo.asp (last visited Apr. 28,
2012) (defining CDO as an “investment-grade security backed by a pool of bonds,
loans and other assets”).
49. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
50. See id. at 329–30 (alleging that Citigroup knew in advance that selling the
portfolio would be difficult if it disclosed its intention to get rid of the negatively
projected assets).
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realized $160 million in profits for the CDO, while investors lost
hundreds of millions of dollars.51
In the complaint against Citigroup’s employee, Brian Stoker, the
SEC alleged that Citigroup knew it could not place the liabilities of a
“CDO-squared” if it disclosed how it had been put together.52 The
SEC, however, failed to include this information in the complaint
against Citigroup.53 Instead, the SEC chose to charge Citigroup with
negligence only, even though the allegations appeared to be knowing
and fraudulent, which normally result in scienter-based charges.54
The SEC filed a proposed consent judgment the same day it filed a
complaint against Citigroup. 55 The proposed consent judgment
stipulated that Citigroup agree to the entry of an order enjoining
them from future violations, “requiring the payment of $285 million,
consisting of disgorgement of $160 million, prejudgment interest of
$30 million, and a civil penalty of $95 million.” 56 Judge Rakoff
found the proposed decree “neither reasonable, nor fair, nor
adequate, nor in the public’s interest.”57 Judge Rakoff then criticized
the SEC’s long policy of allowing defendants to enter consent
judgments without admitting or denying the allegations.58 He also
emphasized the need for more facts to determine whether the
proposed decree met the required standard.59
Citigroup, however, was not the first time Judge Rakoff expressed
his disapproval of the policy and standard applied to consent
decrees. 60 In SEC v. Bank of America, Judge Rakoff refused to

51. Id.
52. Complaint at 10, SEC v. Stoker, No. 11-CIV-7388, 2011 WL 4965844
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
53. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 329–30 (noting that
language from the Stoker complaint is missing from the Citigroup complaint).
54. See id. at 334 n.7 (noting that the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with scienterbased violations for a factual scenario very similar to the one in Citigroup).
55. See SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 2.
56. See id. at 3.
57. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 335 (concluding that the
lack of a factual basis results in a consent judgment that does not meet the public
interest standard).
58. See id. at 322 (finding that the policy deprives the court of “the most minimal
assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being asked to impose has any basis
in fact”).
59. See id. (concluding that more facts were needed to decide whether relief is
justified).
60. See, e.g., SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (expressing reservations for questions in future proceedings regarding
the “no admit/deny” policy); SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10
Civ. 0215(JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
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approve a settlement after the SEC alleged that Bank of America
misled investors about billions of dollars in payments to former
Merrill Lynch employees after Bank of America acquired Merrill
Lynch.61 Judge Rakoff claimed that the settlement proposal “was a
contrivance designed to provide the SEC with a façade of
enforcement.”62 He also alluded to greater scrutiny because the SEC
was asking the court to impose injunctive prohibitions against the
defendant.63
Through a combination of decisions on SEC settlements, Judge
Rakoff focused on three main issues with consent judgments:
deference given to the SEC in determining the public’s interest, the
“no admit/deny” provision in consent judgments, and the lack of
factual support for settlements. 64 Judge Rakoff made clear his
dissatisfaction with the SEC’s “no admit/deny” policy when he
hesitantly approved a consent judgment in SEC v. Vitesse
Semiconductor Corp. 65 The policy, said Judge Rakoff in Vitesse,
results in “confusion and hypocrisy,” leaving the public unaware of
the actual truth. 66 Judge Rakoff acknowledged the substantial
deference given to the Commission, but also noted that the court
determines whether the practice of not admitting or denying
allegations is “unreasonable or contrary to the public interest as to
warrant its disapproval.” 67 Judge Rakoff therefore rejected the
SEC’s position that when a defendant does not expressly deny the
allegations, the public somehow knows the truth about those

61. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509–10 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(ruling that the consent judgment did not meet the necessary standards).
62. Id. at 510 (concluding that the proposed consent judgment could not be found
fair even under the most deferential review).
63. See id. at 508 (noting that because the SEC was asking the court to invoke its
own contempt power, a closer review of the proposed consent decree was necessary).
64. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (expressing reservations
for questions in future proceedings regarding the “no admit/deny” policy); Bank of Am.
Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *1, *5–6 (recognizing that the updated, proposed consent
judgment contained a better developed statement of facts and providing that the court
must defer to the SEC, but that deference should never be absolute).
65. See Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (stating that the
consent judgment was approved only due to unusual circumstances, such as parallel
criminal proceedings in which defendants admitted their guilt and the company’s
financial difficulties).
66. See id. at 309 (noting that the public will never know whether the charges
brought by the SEC are true if the defendant refuses to admit the allegations and the
SEC refuses to provide enough facts to prove the allegations).
67. But see id. at 310 (explaining that this case presented a unique set of facts that
resulted in admissions of three of the four defendants in parallel criminal proceedings).
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allegations.68 A consent judgment, according to Judge Rakoff, is not
evidence of anything; 69 instead, it is viewed as the cost of doing
business.70 The judge further expressed concern that abiding by a
process that involves no factual basis precludes the court from
exercising its own appropriate judgment.71
II. THE TWO STANDARDS AND THEIR DIFFERENT IMPACTS ON
CONSENT JUDGMENTS

After the headlining opinion issued in SEC v. Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc., it is difficult to tell which standard courts will apply in
granting consent judgments moving forward. 72 Judge Rakoff’s
decision can thus change the way the SEC brings future enforcement
cases. 73 Some may call him a hero for demanding greater
accountability in cases of alleged Wall Street fraud. 74 Others,
however, see his decision as a dangerous shift that requires the SEC
to spend more time and money on litigation, ultimately reducing the
number of cases it can effectively pursue, which decreases its
effectiveness as an agency.75
68. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (finding the argument “wrong as a matter of law and unpersuasive as a matter of
fact”).
69. See id. (stating that the allegations have no evidentiary value and cannot be
used in subsequent litigation).
70. See id. at 333 (citing Memorandum on Behalf of Citigroup Global Markets,
Inc. in Support of the Proposed Final Judgment and Consent at 6, SEC v. Citigroup
Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387(JSR), 2011
WL 5386583) (explaining that Citigroup’s board members exercised “their business
judgment” in deciding to settle the case and avoid litigation against the SEC and other
consequences that would result).
71. Cf. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (finding that without
knowledge of the facts, the court becomes a “handmaiden” to a negotiated settlement).
72. See Bondi & Fischer, supra note 11 (stating that other judges have begun to
question SEC settlements); Felix Salmon, Judge Rakoff’s Fraught Decision, REUTERS
BLOG (Nov. 28, 2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/11/28/jed-rakoffsfraught-decision/ (noting that in light of Judge Rakoff’s decision, it is unclear what
happens next).
73. See id. (“If the SEC is unable to impose penalties and obtain injunction in
federal court without an admission of wrongdoing by the defendant, the SEC will be
forced either to enter into settlements outside of the judiciary’s purview, to obtain
wrongdoings from defendants, or to prove its allegations at trial.”); see also Wilczek,
supra note 11 (reporting that attorneys, in response to Judge Rakoff’s decision, believe
that the judgment may cause changes in enforcement actions, including more
administrative cases).
74. See, e.g., David S. Hilzenrath, The Honorable Judge Rakoff v. Corporate
America, the SEC, Cynicism and the ‘64 Phillies, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2012, at G1
(describing Judge Rakoff as a “rare authority”).
75. See, e.g., Wilczek, supra note 11 (noting that critics of Judge Rakoff’s decision
believe that detailed statements of facts or an admission to wrongful conduct may hurt
the SEC’s enforcement program and divert resources used for the investigation of other
frauds); Hilzenrath, supra note 74 (describing Judge Rakoff as a “headline chaser”).
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Consider the following hypothetical scenario: MG Global
Corporation (“MG Global”) is a renowned subprime lender76 with a
market value of $25 billion. On February 25, 2012, the SEC filed a
complaint alleging that MG Global engaged in misrepresentation in
the sale of mortgage-backed securities by misrepresenting the quality
of the underlying mortgages. The misrepresentation resulted in
losses to investors in the amount of $3 billion and a net profit for MG
Global of at least $110 million. The SEC charged MG Global with
negligence in violation of Section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities
Act of 1933. Individual suits were brought against MG Global’s
chief executive officer and chief financial officer, alleging that they
were behind the misrepresentation of the mortgages.
On the same day, MG Global consented to the entry of a consent
judgment without admitting or denying the allegations of the
complaint. The consent judgment permanently enjoined MG Global
from engaging in future violations of securities laws, required MG
Global to pay a disgorgement of $110 million and a civil penalty of
$63 million, and required MG Global to undertake certain internal
measures for a period of five years. The latter requirement was
designed to improve corporate governance. When applied to these
facts, the traditional standard and the Rakoff standard can cause
diverging results.
A. The Consent Judgment Between MG Global Corporation and the
SEC Would Be Granted Under the Traditional Standard Because
Great Deference Is Given to the SEC, and the “No Admit/Deny”
Provision Is Not Questioned

If a court applies the traditional standard to the facts of MG
Global, the proposed consent judgment will likely be approved. To
determine whether the terms of the decree between the SEC and MG
Global are reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest, a court
reviews the circumstances in which the decree is proposed.77
Reasonableness relates to the relative strength of the parties
litigating. 78 The reasonableness of a proposed settlement must

76. See Subprime Lender Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/subprimelender.asp#axzz258IhpJrb (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (“[A] type of
lender that specializes in lending to borrowers with a tainted or limited credit history.”).
77. See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309–10
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
78. See United States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 1990)
(explaining how courts are to determine the reasonableness of a consent decree).
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account for foreseeable risks of losses to the Commission. 79 MG
Global paid $63 million in penalties even though its
misrepresentation resulted in $3 billion in losses to investors.
However, a settlement that results in less than full recovery of the
losses caused by the defendant’s actions can still be reasonable. 80
Here, the $63 million penalty, which is approximately two percent of
the total amount of losses suffered by MG Global’s shareholders,
resembles fines paid (on a percentage basis) in previously approved
consent judgments.81
An evaluation of a consent judgment is not a chance for the court
to “reach beyond the complaint to evaluate claims that the
government did not make and to inquire as to why they were not
made.” 82 Here, the SEC used its own judgment in charging MG
Global with negligence and reaching the $63 million penalty through
its investigative efforts. 83 Because the SEC is responsible for
educating and informing potential and current investors of securities
laws violations,84 one may ask how potential investors know what
securities laws MG Global actually violated when the court and the
public do not have proof of what actually happened. While this is a
legitimate question, the court is not to turn the review of a consent
judgment into a trial.85 The total payment of $63 million in civil
penalties was the result of a comprehensive investigation and
“reasonably reflects the monetary relief likely to be available to the
Commission if successful at trial on the merits.”86

79. See id. at 89–90 (explaining that determining the reasonableness of a consent
decree includes whether the settlement compensates the public for the cost of response
measures and takes into consideration the relative strength of the parties).
80. See id. at 90 (stating that even if the government has a strong case against a
defendant, success at trial still requires time and money, making settlements a preferred
option).
81. See, e.g., WorldCom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (granting a consent judgment
with a penalty of 1.125% of the total amount of losses suffered by shareholders).
82. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
83. See SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 19 (explaining that the penalty sought
by the SEC reflects consideration of impact and a number of other factors).
84. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing the means
in which the agency protects the public’s interest); see also The Investor Advocate,
supra note 16 (stating that the SEC’s mission is to protect investors and maintain the
markets).
85. See United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 582 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that
when a court reviews a consent decree, the court is not to attempt to resolve the factual
disputes of the case); see also SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 15 (claiming that
requiring a factual resolution of the allegations in the interest of transparency goes
against the Second Circuit’s definition of settlements).
86. See SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 19.
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Courts applying the traditional standard rarely question or
challenge consent judgments when determining the adequacy or
fairness of the decree.87 In applying the traditional standard, courts
are likely to place a stamp of approval regardless of the lack of
factual basis and the presence of a “no admit/deny” provision. 88
Here, MG Global consented to the judgment without admitting or
denying the allegations, so a court would not likely challenge the
consent judgment.
Proceeding with an action by injunction rather than litigation
requires the SEC to give up a number of advantages.89 One of the
most significant advantages the SEC must give up is the findings of
fact and court opinions that clearly set forth all the reasons for a
particular result.90 When a consent decree is brought to a district
judge, because it is a settlement, there are no findings that the
defendant has actually engaged in illegal practices. 91 Further,
remedies that appear to be less than what is deserved might reflect
the weaknesses in the government’s case, and it is “unwarranted” for
a judge to assume that any allegations made in the complaint have
been proven. 92 Requiring MG Global to admit to the allegations
made in the complaint in order to make the consent judgment more
adequate or fair would be “unjustified.”93
In order to serve the public interest, actions brought by an agency
require greater flexibility and deference to the agency’s expertise.94
The duties placed on the Commission to monitor securities make it
responsible for serving the public interest.95 In the hypothetical, the
87. See, e.g., Bondi & Fischer, supra note 11 (stating that the SEC has entered into
such consent judgments for nearly forty years without any objection); see also SEC v.
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (granting a
consent judgment with a “no admit/deny” policy even though the court had reservations
about the policy).
88. See, e.g., Hilzenrath, supra note 74 (describing Judge Rakoff as a “rare
authority” and his position in Citigroup as “novel”).
89. See Clifton, 700 F.2d at 748.
90. Id.
91. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
92. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(explaining that a judge is not to measure remedies as if they were fashioned after trial).
93. See id. (stating that the question is whether the defendant agrees to the terms of
the consent judgment and not whether it will admit wrongdoing).
94. See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 551
(2011).
95. See id.; see also SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 8 (citing Microsoft Corp.,
56 F.3d at 1459) (stating that giving deference to a public agency when evaluating
consent judgments has constitutional underpinnings).
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parties entered an agreement waiving their rights to litigate the issues
involved in the case. The SEC negotiated the terms of the settlement
and was in the best position to determine why and to what degree the
settlement with MG Global advanced the public’s interest.96
Courts typically give great deference to the SEC and do not
question the kinds of policies that have long defined the SEC’s
enforcement program. 97 As a result, courts tend to defer to an
agency’s decision that a decree is in the public’s best interest.98 For
that reason, a presumption of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness
attaches to the settlement, 99 and a judge applying the traditional
standard would approve the proposed consent judgment between the
SEC and MG Global.
B. The Consent Judgment Between MG Global Corporation and the
SEC Would Be Rejected Under the Rakoff Standard Because There
Is No Factual Basis, and the “No Admit/Deny” Provision Does Not
Provide the Court with Any Knowledge of the Truth of the
Allegations

Under the Rakoff standard, a court would find the consent
judgment between the SEC and MG Global inadequate and not in the
public interest. 100 Specifically, a court using the Rakoff standard
would reject the MG Global proposed consent judgment because the
fines are inadequate, there is little to no factual basis, and the public
interest would not be served.
When fines are insignificant and do little to deter violators, a
consent judgment is inadequate and cannot be granted.101 There is
little deterrence if all a defendant must do after getting caught for
96. See SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1984) (maintaining that the
court’s role is to ensure the decree is reasonable, not to determine that a decree is
appropriate).
97. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (indicating that courts
rarely challenged the SEC’s policy until Judge Rakoff’s decision).
98. See Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529–30 (explaining that the agency is to decide that
a judgment is appropriate and the court is to ensure that proposed judgment is
reasonable).
99. Cf. Litigation Release, SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC (Jun. 21, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2011/lr22008.htm (noting the standard used to
approve a settlement involving the market and structuring of a CDO).
100. See, e.g., SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (opining that Citigroup received the minimum sanctions when
compared to previous violations made by other defendants who paid more in penalties);
SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 511–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting a
consent judgment due to the low monetary penalty imposed).
101. See Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 511–12 (rejecting the consent
judgment due to the insufficient monetary penalty).
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violating securities laws is give back what he gained in profits.102 In
the hypothetical, the consent judgment required a payment of $173
million, consisting of disgorgement of $110 million and a $63
million penalty; yet the actual losses suffered by investors amounted
to $3 billion. Moreover, if the allegations are true, the penalty
imposed is insufficient when compared to MG Global’s wealth and
power. 103 Furthermore, without more facts and an admission or a
denial, there is no way to determine what really happened and if the
remedies sought actually fit the violations.104
According to the Rakoff standard, consent judgments that ask the
court to impose injunctive relief on the basis of unsupported
allegations cannot be granted.105 Allowing defendants to enter into
consent judgments without admitting or denying the underlying
allegations deprives the court of the most minimal assurance that the
injunctive relief sought has any factual basis.106 In the hypothetical,
MG Global did not admit to any of the violations. All the court has
are allegations of negligence. 107 The court reviewing the consent
judgment is entitled to know if the misrepresentation MG Global
made was due to negligence or fraud to determine the reasonability
of the proposed consent agreement. If guilt is neither admitted nor
denied, the ultimate effect of the consent agreement on the company

102. Cf. id. (concluding that the injunctive relief is pointless because the amount is
trivial compared to the company’s worth, and because the ones who actually suffer are
the victims, not the violators).
103. See id. at 512.
104. See, e.g., SEC v. Moran, 944 F. Supp. 286, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding a
lesser penalty more appropriate because “there is an unmistakable difference between
conduct which negligently operates as a fraud when compared to conduct engaged in
with intent to defraud”); see also Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332
(stating that the court is deprived of any assurance that the relief sought is justified);
SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
105. See Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 310; SEC v. Bank of Am.
Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ. 0215(JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *1, *5
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334
(holding that the consent judgment did not include enough proven facts to grant the
court’s approval).
106. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (explaining that the
court is merely a handmaiden to a privately negotiated settlement if the court has no
knowledge of some of the underlying facts).
107. See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (stating that the
SEC chose to charge Citigroup with negligence even though it appears that the
allegations are knowing and fraudulent). But see Moran, 944 F. Supp. at 297 (finding a
lesser penalty more appropriate because “there is an unmistakable difference between
conduct which negligently operates as a fraud when compared to conduct engaged in
with intent to defraud”).
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is insignificant, 108 seeing that it appears that there was really no
wrongdoing on the part of the defendants.109
The SEC argues that the truth about a defendant’s actions becomes
known, and in turn the public interest served, through the litigation
the SEC brings against individuals involved in the violations. 110
Consequently, according to the SEC, if the factual disputes are not
resolved in the consent judgment between the SEC and the company,
the allegations will certainly be resolved in any parallel
proceedings. 111 In the hypothetical, individual suits were brought
against MG Global’s chief executive officer and chief financial
officer; however, despite the SEC’s assertion, parallel proceedings
cannot always resolve the factual allegations. For instance, in SEC v.
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., which the SEC uses to support its
argument, 112 the same charges were brought against all defendants
who were part of the proposed consent judgment.113 The individual
defendants admitted to guilt in parallel criminal proceedings. 114
Judge Rakoff noted the significance of these admissions in informing
the public of the truth of the allegations made against the
defendants. 115 In the hypothetical, there have not been any
admissions of guilt in any parallel proceedings.
The facts surrounding the consent judgment with MG Global are
more similar to the facts in Citigroup, where Citigroup was charged
only with negligence, even though the SEC alleged in the Stoker
complaint fraudulent intent on the part of Citigroup.116 In Citigroup,
108. See Prial, supra note 44.
109. Id. (“[V]ery few companies that agree to settle SEC allegations of wrongdoing

should be able to hide behind the ‘neither admitted nor denied guilt’ phrase.”); see
Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *5 (criticizing the lack of directed
responsibility to specific individuals and noting that the punitive and compensatory
measures are likely to have a modest impact on corporate practice).
110. See SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 15.
111. See, e.g., id. (noting that the ongoing litigation in the Stoker complaint will
“provide a vehicle for resolution of the Commission’s allegations”).
112. See id. (citing SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)) (stating that the SEC’s allegations against Citigroup will be resolved
through the parallel proceedings against the individual defendant).
113. See Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 305–06.
114. Id. at 310.
115. Id. (“[T]he public is not left to speculate about the truth of the essential charges
here brought against [defendants], for they have already admitted those charges in
another public forum.”).
116. Compare SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 321–30 &
329 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the allegations made against Citigroup and the
individual employee, Brian Stoker, are different), with Vitesse Semiconductor Corp.,
771 F. Supp. 2d at 306 (noting that Vitesse and individual defendants were held
responsible for the same fraudulent practices).
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the individual defendant and company were not both included as
parties to the consent judgment.117 Further, the allegations against
each defendant appeared differently based on the language used in
each complaint.118 Thus, an admission by one defendant may not
answer questions about allegations made against another. As such,
parallel proceedings do not always result in a resolution of factual
disputes.119
In the hypothetical consent judgment, the SEC would ask the court
to invoke its contempt power by enjoining MG Global from violating
securities laws.120 The court would consequently review the consent
judgment to determine if it is within the bounds of fairness,
reasonableness, adequacy, and whether it serves the public interest.121
The court would therefore need to know the underlying facts. 122
Viewing the consent judgment between the SEC and MG Global as
simply the cost of doing business does not take into account the
public interest nor does it carefully assess the truth behind the
allegations.123 If a consent judgment rests solely on mere allegations,
the truth about the defendant’s actions is unknown, and thus the
consent agreement would be unreasonable.124 As a result, the public

117. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 330 (charging Citigroup
only with negligence, even though allegations amounting to knowing and fraudulent
intent were apparent).
118. See id. at 330 (noting that language amounting to knowing and fraudulent
intent is missing from the Citigroup complaint).
119. See id. at 333 (explaining that even though there was a parallel proceeding, the
investors were not in a better situation as a result of that proceeding).
120. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(explaining that consent judgments involving a federal agency have aspects of a
judicial decree and thus require a closer review of the terms of the consent judgment).
121. See id.
122. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332 (explaining that the
difference between a settlement amongst private parties and consent judgments
involving a public agency is that private parties can settle a case without ever agreeing
on the facts, whereas some knowledge of the facts are required in a settlement with a
public agency); see also SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ.
0215(JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (noting that the
proposed consent judgment’s greatest characteristic is that it includes a more developed
statement of facts); Johnson, supra note 5, at 628 n.5 (defining public interest to
include a societal interest in the benefits of “adjudication, transparency, and corporate
responsibility”).
123. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (“[T]he parties’
successful resolution of their competing interests cannot be automatically equated with
the public interest.”).
124. See id. at 335 (finding the consent judgment unreasonable because it is based
on mere allegations); see also id. at 333 (rejecting the SEC’s position that not expressly
denying an allegation somehow made the truth about the allegation known to the court
and public).

202

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2:1

interest would not be served,125 and the consent judgment between
the SEC and MG Global would be rejected.
III. A COMBINATION OF BOTH STANDARDS ALLOWS FOR GREATER
ENFORCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY

A clear standard that establishes the necessary elements of a
consent judgment must be adopted in the near future as other courts
begin to apply Judge Rakoff’s standard.126 Consent judgments play a
significant role in the SEC’s enforcement program to stop and punish
violators of securities laws.127 Judge Rakoff’s approach to consent
judgments brings such decrees closer to the standard of “fair,
reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest”; there are, however,
drawbacks. 128 If courts adopt Judge Rakoff’s more demanding
approach, fewer consent judgment settlements will survive, 129
creating a great imposition on the SEC and public. 130 Thus, it is
prudent that a combination of both the traditional standard and the
Rakoff standard be adopted—a standard that will produce consent
judgments that are truly reasonable, fair, adequate, and in the public
interest.131
In the absence of sufficient facts, the court lacks a framework for
determining adequacy. 132 A proposed consent judgment without a
125. See id. at 335 (stating that a successful resolution did not equate to serving the
public’s best interest).
126. See Edward Wyatt, In Challenging S.E.C. Settlement, a Judge in Wisconsin
Cites a Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at B4 (referring to a judge in
Wisconsin who challenged a consent judgment by citing Citigroup).
127. See Interview: SEC Enforcement Division Director Robert Khuzami,
REUTERS
NEWS
&
INSIGHT
(April
27,
2012),
THOMSON
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/News/2012/04_-_April/
Interview__SEC_Enforcement_Division_Director_Robert_Khuzami/ (“[W]e are able
to use the resources we save [through settlements] to fight other frauds and return
money to other harmed investors.”).
128. See id. (explaining that without the “no admit/deny” provision fewer
defendants will settle because of the civil and criminal consequences of an admission
of wrongdoing).
129. See Brief for Business Roundtable as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants
at 7, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No.
11-5527), 2012 WL 2166144 (stating that Judge Rakoff’s decision will result in more
litigation for the federal judiciary to oversee).
130. See id. at 14 (noting that a new approach to proposed consent decrees will
deprive agencies of a crucial enforcement tool, force the SEC to incur great costs from
litigation, and impose onerous burdens on the judiciary).
131. Compare Bondi & Fischer, supra note 11 (contending that refusal to accept
settlements with a “no admit/deny” policy and requiring additional facts will force the
SEC to find alternatives to settlements), with Zimmerman, supra note 94, at 570
(contending that a closer judicial review will give the court an opportunity to exercise
an independent basis for the terms of the consent judgment).
132. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
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factual basis does not serve the public interest because it asks the
court to employ its power and assert its authority on the basis of
unknown facts.133 The court’s role is to exercise some independent
judgment; its role is not to act as a rubber stamp in granting consent
judgments.134 In an economy where greater transparency is needed,
the public deserves to know about the occurrence of violations and
those responsible for them.135
The SEC argues that requiring more facts requires extensive and
expensive discovery.136 However, it is difficult for a court to impose
relief on the basis of mere allegations.137 This is problematic because
the consent judgment between the SEC and MG Global asks the
court to “employ its power and assert its authority when it does not
know the facts.”138 Charging MG Global with negligence and then
allowing it to settle without admitting or denying the allegations ends
up hurting defrauded investors instead of helping them. 139 Those
defrauded investors who try to recoup their losses through private
litigation are at a disadvantage because they cannot bring securities
claims based on negligence, nor can they derive any collateral
estoppel assistance from MG Global’s non-admission/denial of the
SEC’s allegation.140
The SEC has a duty to see that the truth emerges.141 If the court
fails to find the truth, it should not grant judicial enforcement for the
2011) (holding that the consent judgment is “neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate,
nor in the public interest” mainly because there were not enough facts to determine if
the relief was justified under the standards for consent judgments).
133. See id. (noting concern that the court may simply become a “handmaiden” to a
privately negotiated settlement).
134. See id. at 331 (stating that the court’s independent judgment is necessary in a
settlement involving a public agency asking the court to impose injunctive remedies).
135. See Prial, supra note 44 (noting that transparency and accountability are key to
the SEC’s mission, and the public interest is not served if violators of securities laws
can avoid the allegations by paying a fine and not admitting guilt).
136. See Randall Bodner et al., SEC Penalties on Trial, 23 SEC. ENFORCEMENT 18,
25 (2009) (arguing that the point of a settlement is to prevent the costs associated with
preparing for trial).
137. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (holding that
allegations in a complaint are not evidence of anything and do not provide a factual
basis for the court to evaluate the consent judgment).
138. Id. at 335.
139. See id. at 334–35 (stating that the defrauded investors are not actually protected
by the terms of the proposed consent decree because the proposed judgment does not
commit the SEC to returning any of the money recovered from Citigroup to the
defrauded investors).
140. See id. at 334 (finding the combination of the negligence charges with the terms
of the proposed judgment to be a “double blow” to investors leaving them “shortchanged”).
141. See id. at 335.
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mere sake of convenience and deference.142 The role of a judge in
determining whether a decree protects the public interest should
include an evaluation of the facts establishing the allegation.143 Thus,
a better-developed statement of facts is necessary for future consent
judgments.144
Judge Rakoff’s greatest criticism of recently proposed consent
judgments is the inclusion of the “no admit/deny” provision.145 Truth
of the allegations, however, cannot be discovered by simply
removing the “no admit/deny” provision. 146 Further, requiring an
admission of guilt will not create greater enforcement;147 instead, it
will result in fewer settlements.148 The “no admit/deny” provision is
central to the SEC’s enforcement strategy. 149 Without it, banks
become subject to more litigation from investors. 150 As a result,
companies will refuse to enter settlements where they would be
forced to acknowledge liability.151
142. See id. (finding that if a consent judgment is not supported by facts, then
granting such decree would be using the court as an “engine of oppression”).
143. See id. at 332 (holding that the court and the public need some knowledge of
the facts in order to evaluate the justification for the remedies sought in a consent
judgment); see also SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ.
0215(JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (concluding that the
reason the consent decree met the standard was because it was premised on better
developed facts, which were scrutinized by the court).
144. See Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *5 (stating that the “greatest
virtue” of the proposed consent judgment is the better developed statement of facts).
145. See SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (noting the more troubling aspect of the proposed consent judgment is the fact
that the allegations are resolved without the defendant admitting or denying the
allegations brought against them); see also Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp.
2d at 330 (rejecting the proposed consent judgment because the court did not have any
“proven or admitted facts” upon which to base its own independent judgment).
146. Cf. Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *5 (stating that the new consent
judgment has a better developed statement of underlying facts while making no
mention of the “no admit/deny” provision’s effect on establishing those facts).
147. See SEC Mem. of Law, supra note 18, at 11–12 (arguing that, by refusing to
allow defendants to deny allegations, the SEC prevents confusion over the accuracy of
the allegations made in the complaint).
148. See Interview: SEC Enforcement Division Director Robert Khuzami, supra note
127.
149. See Jean Eaglesham & Suzanne Kapner, SEC Cops Want to Fight U.S. Judge
Street, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142
4052970204844504577098833058976236.html (explaining that if the appeals court
upholds Judge Rakoff’s ruling in Citigroup, it will become highly persuasive authority
for other courts around the country, negating an important SEC strategy).
150. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334 (implying that the
inclusion of the “no admit/deny” policy serves as a protection for companies who
violate securities laws because it limits the number of suits investors can bring against
these violators).
151. See Prial, supra note 44 (indicating that, in the absence of a “no admit/deny”
provision, companies will continue to fight the SEC).
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Consent judgments are an effective and efficient means for
resolving disputes. 152 Due to the advantages associated with
settlements, it would be a major disservice to the SEC and the public
if consent judgments no longer served the purpose they were
intended to serve.153 With settlements, the SEC is able to spread its
limited resources to go after the largest number of cases possible.154
A number of factors determine whether judicial enforcement is
appropriate. To allow for greater transparency, there needs to be
some factual basis in proposed judgments that gives the public
insight into what violations actually occurred.155 The SEC should be
required to “explain the evidence which is available, and . . . offer a
rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.”156
If there is no admission, there needs to be a stronger framework, i.e.,
something more than mere allegations. 157 Courts can require the
SEC to provide a written factual predicate for why it believes the
court should find the proposed settlement judgment fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the public interest.158 The benefits of providing the
court with a written factual predicate provide increased transparency
to investors and the markets and enhanced guidance to companies
and individuals about the conduct underlying the violation. 159
Removing the “no admit/deny” policy is not the best means to
greater enforcement. Instead, there needs to be a balance between
the advantages of consent judgment settlements and the need for
greater transparency in financial markets.
152. See SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1984) (stating that the SEC
tries to avoid the risks and costs of litigation by entering into consent judgments).
153. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
settlements conserve SEC resources and inform potential investors of securities
violators); Eaglesham & Kapner, supra note 149 (stating that Robert Khuzami, the
SEC’s Enforcement Director, believes that rejecting settlements will make it harder to
police Wall Street).
154. See Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529–30.
155. See Johnson, supra note 5, at 674 (noting that it is in the public’s interest to be
able to distinguish bad actors from those who have made minor violations of securities
laws).
156. Zimmerman, supra note 94, at 570 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
157. See SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (stating that no admission and no factual basis leaves the court depriving the
public of ever knowing the truth and does not meet the standard of “fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the public interest”).
158. See Wilczek, supra note 11 (noting that supporters of Judge Rakoff’s decision
find it justifiable to have the SEC provide a rationale for the enforcement penalties it is
seeking in order to shed light on whether settlements are adequate).
159. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The decision in Citigroup significantly altered many courts’
decisions regarding SEC consent judgments. With courts in other
districts already citing to Judge Rakoff’s famous opinion, the SEC is
concerned this could hamper its enforcement program.160
The benefits and challenges that come with applying a stricter
standard, as suggested by Judge Rakoff, are topics of conversation all
over the securities world. Investors will benefit from removal of the
“no admit/deny” provision because it will be easier for them to
recoup their losses if banks are forced to acknowledge liability.
Furthermore, large companies will no longer be able to hide behind
the “no admit/deny” policy and eliminate liability by simply paying a
fine. Removing this “easy way out” for violators of securities law
will promote transparency and accountability.
This more demanding standard, however, poses challenges as well.
The SEC settles most of its cases by consent decrees, and creating a
more stringent standard can result in more costs and greater risks.
Consent judgments save resources, time, and money. As a result, the
SEC is better able to effectively and reasonably allocate its resources
and bring more charges than it would bring if it had to litigate most
of its cases. Judge Rakoff’s decision, if approved on appeal, can
significantly change the way securities laws are enforced. Requiring
an admission subjects defendants to collateral estoppel with regard to
the asserted claims. This will compel defendants to defend the
allegations made against them rather than settle. With more trials
come more costs, which is something the SEC tries to avoid. Due to
the advantages and disadvantages that both standards afford, the
SEC, the defendants, and the public would be better served with a
hybrid standard possessing elements of both.
Requiring defendants to admit to the SEC’s allegations while at
the same time requiring the SEC to provide a more factual basis for
those allegations defeats the purpose of a settlement. In settlements
where the defendant does not admit or deny the allegations, a court
should require more facts to establish a greater framework. This will
give courts a better idea of whether the terms of the decree fit the
violations alleged. For cases where the court is left with little factual
basis, it is fair to require an admission of guilt because the court will
have some knowledge of the truth of the allegations. Further, the
160. See Eaglesham & Kapner, supra note 149 (explaining that negotiations for
several consent judgments stalled because the SEC is unsure about what it must ask for
in the settlements).
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court can better justify the penalties imposed and properly determine
whether those penalties fit the violations. To ensure that consent
judgments meet the standard of reasonable, fair, adequate, and in the
public interest, courts should apply a standard that combines both the
traditional standard and the Rakoff standard. Until then, the
ambiguity in the law will leave the SEC unsure of the proper means
of enforcement, and the public will not receive the transparency it
deserves.

